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## English Summary

Edited and translated by Philip Earl Steele

### From the editors:

Poland's integration with the European Union, which Poles are about to decide in referendum, represents a choice for the many years ahead. For many Poles it entails a historical and civilizational choice. For others it is a pragmatic choice, one that stems from a sober calculation of both national and personal interests. Combining these two approaches, the authors of this issue of *Polska w Europie* have once again endeavored to marshal the *pro* and *con* arguments pertaining to European integration. The analyses found in the section entitled EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE give flesh to the range of reflections and debate on the theoretical bases of this process.

**Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse** addresses the connection between theory and practice in examining possible scenarios for the EU's future development. In his paper "Theoretical models for the future of the European Union" Grosse presents the theoretical thinking to date and distinguishes four analytical realms, to wit, the conceptual, economic, institutional, and strategic roles of political elites. In so doing he arrives at the conclusion that Poland - in constructively participating in the process of the EU's institutional and political changes - should focus on building up her position on the European stage. In Poland's interest is the search for a proper place within the Union, the achievement of the economic and political specialization that will enable us to effectively utilize our strengths, and the successful pursuit of our national interests - which, at the same time, are those of Europe as a whole. Thus, Poland should acknowledge the thrusts of Europe's

politics, especially as concerns relations with the United States. In this vein Grosse cautions that Poland would risk a weakening of her position in the united Europe were she to proceed counter to those trends.

Poland's debate over visions for political and institutional change in Europe and over Poland's place within the EU will bear positive fruit in the context of our June referendum on EU membership. **Tadeusz Mazowiecki**, **Andrzej Ajnenkiel**, and **Marcin Przeworski** – panelists at our *Talkshop* “Following the Summit in Copenhagen” – stress that Poland's debate ought to become a model of positive and constructive thinking into European affairs and should work to define our post-accession national objectives, along with the means to attain them. After having diagnosed the present state of our preparedness for EU membership, both in light of historical developments and our partners' expectations, the panelists not only stipulated a redoubling of our preparations, but also a change in the way Poland's political and economic elites approach those efforts. All of the *Talkshop's* panelists further agreed that the campaign leading up to the referendum should be addressed primarily to Euroskeptics and politically inactive milieux – i.e., that the hitherto typical practice of preaching to the converted be abandoned. Notwithstanding that, their discussion – similarly as with the material in this issue's theoretical section – can help provide “the converted” with powerful and positive intellectual arguments, ones based on a careful accounting of the costs and benefits of European integration.

**Jacek Czaputowicz** (*vide* “The English School of international relations and its approach to European integration”) presents the genesis, history, and theoretical achievement of the English school and then evaluates its input into the development of theories on international relations. Czaputowicz explains the English school's basic conceptual categories (the international system, the international society, and the world society) as well as the premises of the theoretical currents within them (pluralism, solidarism). In so doing Czaputowicz underlines the “Europeanness” of the English school, characterized as it is by protest against the domination of American authorities in today's theoretical reflection upon international relations. The current renaissance of the English school is accompanied by attempts to formulate a new research approach, one whose representatives are most keenly interested in the EU as a concrete example and the most developed international community.

The process of European integration – as **Katarzyna Żukrowska** writes in “The application of theories of integration in European practice” – is a crowning of the efforts of scholars who sought to curb aggressive interaction between states. Żukrowska recounts the struggle to create theories of integration and the premises of

their popularity before going on to describe the practical measures accepted and the subsequent phases of European integration. On the basis of an analysis of momentous decisions made by members of the European Communities she concludes that Europe's political integration was conditioned by close economic cooperation. It was the measurable benefits of an economic character that made possible the passage to the political phase of integration, the most significant manifestation of which is that of the work upon a constitution for a united Europe.

The second thematic bloc of this issue is entitled INTERNATIONAL SECURITY and is host to *Polska w Europie's* resident experts. The *Talkshop* "Global terrorism - Iraq - American responsibility and Europe", held in early October of last year, focused on the challenge posed by terrorism and by Iraq to the international community. The *Talkshop's* panelists **Janusz Onyszkiewicz**, **Stanisław Koziej**, and **Jacek Czapotowicz** forecast the unfolding of events surrounding the Iraqi crisis, stressing throughout the implications for NATO's future and the future of European-American relations. Minister Onyszkiewicz argued the inevitability of a return to the discussion on NATO's role that took place prior to and during the Washington Summit. General Stanisław Koziej foresaw the inevitability of military operations focused on regime change in Baghdad. He also expressed his view that the decision to summon NATO expeditionary forces was premature, stating that what first should have been done was to resolve politico-strategic considerations, adopt a new NATO doctrine that postulated crisis response on a global scale, and then determine operational frameworks for the functioning of the Alliance in its new circumstances. Both the panelists and those in attendance commented on the new, preventative strategy of American security policy, as well as on the current crisis in the international system and on the roles of the UN and NATO. They also noted the peculiar dilemma for Poland's foreign policy, concluding that in supporting multilateral solutions (within the structures of NATO and the EU) Poles at the same time find themselves sliding into Americanophilia. Those from the audience who drew attention to Polish foreign policy noted their anxiety over the fact that Polish public opinion was divided: Polish society, they pointed out, was neither unanimous in its position vis-à-vis Poland's involvement in the conflict, nor vis-a-vis Poland's choice of allies.

The thorough-going analysis entitled "Poland's arms industry at the crossroads" neatly reflects the context of the changes in the existing international system and Poland's search for her place within it. Its author, **Krystian Piatkowski**, sketches the external and internal conditions of the present situation in Poland's arms sector (the role of the state, exports, market outlets, technological sophistication of Polish products) and then detailedly analyzes the causes and effects of the crisis of the

1990s. The approaches toward reforming Poland's arms industry seen to date (vide Klimek-Ogryczak, Szarawarski-Kaczmarek) were, Piątkowski writes, unsuccessful for they did not take into consideration the global tendencies to be observed in the arms industry (i.e., consolidation, privatization, international programs, revolution in warfare). Any further ignoring of those processes, Piątkowski concludes, risks stagnation and the isolation of Poland's defense industry. Poland, as every other country in Europe, is not in a position to independently produce any complex arms system at a reasonable price. Indicating the direction of the necessary changes in this sector Piątkowski strongly emphasizes that Poland's long-term developmental strategy must first and foremost heed her ever deeper integration with Europe. It must also pay heed to the redefinition of the role of the state, structural and ownership transformations, the inflow of foreign capital, and to the fundamental changes in the way the arms sector, the system of arms trade, and that of defense planning are managed. After all, the main client of Poland's arms industry is and shall remain the Polish Armed Services.

This issue is rounded out by two sets of remarks in the section ON A FOURTH PILLAR FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION. They are a continuation of the discussion on the Appeal of the Polish Council of the European Movement to create a new EU pillar to embrace education, science, and culture. **Dominik Morawski** writes from the perspective of his years-long experience working in Rome. His primary point is that Polish political elites do not appreciate the realms of culture and custom in interpersonal relations - and this despite the fact that those realms ultimately represent the most important factor in improving Poland's image in the world and in furthering the smooth and effective contribution of Poles to Europe's integration.

**Antoni Kukliński**, in turn, calls for an offensive of Polish thinking on Europe and poses concrete questions upon which the discussion on the future of Europe as a player on the world's stage should concentrate.

# European integration in theory and practice

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

## Theoretical models for the future of the European Union

Dr Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, who hails from the Institute for Public Affairs and the Center for Regional Studies, begins his analysis of the theoretical models for the future of the European Union with a reflection on the factors British historian Arnold Toynbee cited as causative in the decline and fall of great empires. Thus, Grosse mentions such matters as the lack of creativity among social elites, the lack of shared vision for the future, and the lack of generally shared values contributing to social stability and shared identity. He also cites the fall of authorities and the erosion of the elites' leadership, institutional inertia, the inability to make strategic choices, and the ensuing intensification of conflicts of interest, particularism, and the loss of steerability over the system as a whole.

Grosse then points to the European Union's early beginnings, stressing how it was set into motion by the common strategic vision Europeans so deeply shared following the horrors of the Second World War and the atrocities Germans had committed. The fear of this ever recurring, Grosse explains, is what initially compelled Europeans to cooperate. The Cold War, he explains, further propelled European integration forward.

But these matters, Grosse writes, are no longer pertinent. Nor, he quickly adds, are such more recent events as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the decision to expand the EU, and the introduction of the Euro. Here Grosse states that economic sluggishness has weakened both the drive toward integration and strategic thinking, as well. He then asks: will economic rivalry with the US and the Asian countries provide a new stimulus for bold decision-making in Europe? Will Germany's increasing domination in Europe do so? How to forestall the reversion to nationalism in Europe?

Grosse writes that there are at least four important aspects for the analysis of Europe's future. The first is that of the sphere of ideas, particularly as that concerns values and symbolic reference. He specifies that at key issue here is the set of values to be subsumed under the heading of 'solidarity' vis-a-vis those values that would guarantee the prosperity of the society's most affluent groups. He clarifies that such solidarity is coterminous with the redistribution of wealth to the benefit of peripheries, under-developed regions, and to societal groups that fall

below the European norm. In expanding on this aspect Grosse remarks on how it also impacts the issues at the rub of the common good and civil society on the one hand, with individualism and liberalism on the other.

The second aspect concerns Europe's economic power and its ability to attain a competitive position at a global scale. Here Grosse reviews the discussion on the role of globalization in European integration, the role of nation-states, and that of large international corporations. He further reflects on cases like that of how certain French giants work in partnership with France's political authorities to maintain their privileged position on the market, and on how agricultural lobbies maintain fierce protectionist pressure on their national governments and thus also impede European integration.

The third aspect Grosse addresses is that of Europe's institutional structure. He writes that Europeans may yet implement one of several models, be they loosely referred to as federal, confederative, or network - the latter, Grosse suggests, being the one that best describes the EU of today. He goes on to state that a confederative model for Europe would favor the large countries and would create a qualitative divide among the EU's soon-to-be 25 members.

The fourth aspect concerns Europe's political elites. Are they, Grosse asks, capable of creating a new quality in supranational relations - or are they too strongly bound to their national electorates? Does their exist in Europe of community of ideas that binds social-democratic or conservative parties together in such a way that offers a basis for pan-European unity? Grosse goes on to argue that the answers to these questions cast doubt on the hopes for true European unity.

Grosse then takes up a description of the liberal model of economic integration. Here he remarks on the relative poverty of Europe's upcoming members in Central Europe and the problems this raises for Europe's overall development and global competitiveness. He next addresses such issues as Europe's structural unemployment and inability to keep pace with America in applying new technologies on a large industrial scale. In this vein he notes that Europe has not a single industry in the design and manufacture of microprocessors and that Europe has failed to spawn large concerns competitive at a global scale. He notes that current laws hinder the merger of industries, that high taxes and labor costs shun foreign investors, and that the vociferous hopes to "catch up with America" are unrealistic unless Europe is willing to draw from America's institutional experience.

Turning to the federal model, Grosse writes that - in reflection of their own federal experience - it is the Germans who have the most coherent vision. Grosse

goes on to explain that Germany's strategy vis-à-vis the EU rests upon four pillars: the strengthening of Germany's position within the Council; the strengthening of the EU Parliament and government; the gathering together within the EU of countries who accede to German policies and Germany's strategic vision; and the management of EU expansion as a means to revive the concept of *Mittleuropa*. Grosse goes on to indicate that much of the foregoing presupposes a model of integration that favors the strong. Grosse later writes that one of the barriers to increasing the power of the European Parliament is the fact that European voters do not have a strong European identity, that the societies of Europe do not comprise one nation. If only for this reason Grosse argues that European political parties may be expected to remain divided along regional and national lines. Closing out this point Grosse observes that the European Commission also remains under the control of member-countries, as does even the European Central Bank.

Taking up the confederative model Grosse cites the discussion of political scientists who identify in this model three primary currents: neofunctionalism, the network approach, and the intergovernmental. The first posits that ever-deepening economic integration leads to political integration at the European level - as a "side-effect", as it were. The network (or, multi-level governance) school stresses the interconnectedness of Europe as an entity across a range of levels, i.e., the supranational, state, regional, and local levels. In this regard adherents of the network approach are at odds with both adherents of the intergovernmental and neofunctionalist approaches, Grosse writes.

Intergovernmentalism, especially as per Andrew Moravcsik, stresses the primacy of national governments at every stage of European integration, i.e., that integration was always pursued in the interests of member-states. Grosse goes on to cite Moravcsik's argument that European integration represents a regional response to the challenge of globalization.

Having reviewed these models and approaches, Grosse concludes that the European Union is therefore a hybrid organization, one dominated by a confederative structure accented with elements of a federal character. Grosse states that perhaps the European Convention's work will strengthen the EU's federal aspects, but that it will remain overridingly confederative and dominated by Germany and France. He then writes that Europe continues to lack an ideology that would lend to the emergence of a shared European identity and sense of pan-European civic spirit. Moreover, the bureaucratic structure of the EU, dominated as it is by national governments, lobbies, and individual politicians, inhibits the rise of grass-roots civic spirit in Europe, Grosse writes. By way of illustration he cites the

case of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, whose first action as chairman of the European Constitutional Convention was to demand a monthly salary of 20,000 Euros.

Grosse argues that Europe is also lacking a common vision for the future. He states that the postulates of catching up with the US are "highly inadequate ideas for European integration". He then stresses the absence of bold thinking on Europe's future, noting that the successes of anti-establishment political groupings (*vide* Haider, Berlusconi, Le Pen) reflect the frustration of European masses in their feeling that Europe is adrift.

In the final section of his paper Grosse takes up Poland's integration with the EU. He emphasizes that the process of negotiating membership has been throughout dominated by national governments. Grosse also stresses that during the final stages of negotiation, Poles - as the populations of other candidate-countries - came to see the EU not as a body of fellow-Europeans who sought to unify a continent brutally divided against its will, but as a venture led by the coolest of calculators. Drawing upon the work of Frank Schimmelfennig, Grosse goes on to argue that candidate-countries gave up their cards together with signing their associative agreements, the terms of which favored EU countries in trade with them.

Moving on to foreign policy, Grosse notes that Poland would risk a weakening of her position within Europe were she to remain apart from the general trends in Europe's relations with the US. He notes that even for Britain, who can otherwise "afford" such policies, there are costs to be paid in Europe.

Drawing his comments to a close, Grosse states that Poland's membership in the European Union must not resemble instances from Poland's past when foreign involvements indeed represented an escape from Polish problems. He stresses that Poles must not allow themselves to think that they can somehow shift their own responsibilities to the EU. In this regard he appeals for Poles to carefully formulate their thinking on the EU's institutional changes and to hammer out a common platform on Poland's place in Europe. To do less, he states, would be to banish Poland to Europe's political and intellectual margins.

## **Following the European Union Summit in Copenhagen: Perspectives and Problems**

*Talkshop held by the "Polska w Europie" Foundation, January 16, 2003*

Moderator Zygmunt Skórzyński opened the January *Talkshop* with reference to the fact that Poland's domestic political troubles had overshadowed the weighty events that had just transpired at the December EU Summit in

Copenhagen. Skórzyński went on to note that whereas until recently the debate on European integration had largely passed public opinion by, in the most recent period the concerted efforts of representatives of the Polish government, Sejm, and Senate in the work underway at the European Convention had improved the situation in terms of spreading information and providing interpretation, evaluation, and analysis. Nonetheless, Skórzyński was quick to add that a portion of the opportunity to improve Poland's information policy had been squandered: the information campaign of the last year had much more resembled a soap commercial than a bid to raise society's awareness of Europe. All the more so, he said, is it therefore incumbent upon the relevant NGOs to interpret, analyze, evaluate, and discuss. He then introduced the Talkshop's panelists, two of whom were among the founders of the *Polska w Europie Talkshops* in 1985 - Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Andrzej Ajnenkiel - along with Marcin Przeciszewski, director of the Catholic Information Agency.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki was first to take the floor. He noted that the final results of Poland's negotiations were not as fabulous as it had seemed on the evening of December 13, nor were they as bad as some of the critics would have it. The former Prime Minister went on to say that now was the time to focus on Poland's referendum on EU membership and to look beyond to Poland's place in Europe, for these are matters of surpassing national importance.

Mazowiecki observed that the European Union is an entity ever in a state of reform, and he said that this represents both a strength and a weakness. A strength, he explained, in the sense that it avoids stagnation; but a weakness in that it wastes a lot of energy. He then noted that the EU will not soon embrace all of Europe, and that this remains a thorny issue, if only to consider Turkey. Here he said that he cannot agree with those who would sever Europe from its Christian roots, and noted that Western Europe has by no means been successful in its relations with the Turks living there. To this day, he said, they live in ghettos, completely isolated from broader society.

Mazowiecki declared that he is not a supporter of a United States of Europe. He explained that when Winston Churchill had advanced that idea he was thinking of a Europe without the UK. He then stated that he supports closer cooperation, but that neither federation nor confederation describes the path the European Union is on, a path, he said, that is leading to a novel form of joining states and societies. Mazowiecki then asked, is the EU but an economic league of states? - is it a strong political union? - and is there such a thing as a spirit of Europe, a Europe of shared values? He answered that the economic

aspect would long predominate and that Europe's spirit cannot be placed within the structures of the EU: it must remain within societies and within the realm occupied by such institutions as churches and social organizations.

He then turned to the EU's ability to harmonize solidarity and calculated interests. He said that the element of solidarity cannot be denied and he pointed to structural funds and the fact that less-developed countries gain through EU membership - cautioning, however, that Poles must be prepared for the game of interests. But here he at once further cautioned that Poles must desist in their exclusive focus on EU funds and start to think more in terms of cooperation, of joint undertaking. To think not of 'us' and 'them', but of only 'us', 'us Europeans'. Mazowiecki said that such thinking would define Poland's place in Europe, but he did not neglect to stress the equal importance of good governance within Poland. He closed his remarks with reference to a recent issue of "Więź" (the Catholic intellectual monthly he long served as editor-in-chief), where he had read the words of a range of Western European intellectuals who harbor high hopes and expectations regarding Poland's membership in the European Union. Higher, he said, than Poles themselves often do.

Andrzej Ajnenkiel began by saying that he would direct his thoughts toward the historical aspects of Poland's accession to the EU and toward the shape of Poland's coming activity within the EU. Somewhat as an aside he noted that he oftentimes has the feeling that his and kindred milieux are in the habit of preaching to the converted, that they do not address non-converts, and that they are at a complete loss in confronting their adversaries.

Ajnenkiel took as his starting point the 1944 book by Peter Jordan (published in the US) entitled *Central Union of Europe*. Ajnenkiel reported that in that book Jordan had presented the proposal of creating a loose federation of states from Latvia all the way to Greece and Albania. Ajnenkiel then mentioned General Sikorski's efforts to forge a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation.

Ajnenkiel then attempted to diagnose the contemporary challenges before Poland. He noted that - despite the veritable boom in access to education - Polish institutions of higher learning have failed to instill the onetime ethos of the intelligentsia. He went on to note that what lies behind the concepts of those who oppose Poland's membership in the EU is Russophilia. He pointed out the absurdity in the fact that the Catholic rightist-party LPR, which is anti-EU, refuses to acknowledge the abuse of Catholics in Russia and the widespread violations of human rights there. Ajnenkiel subsequently argued that were Poland to remain outside the EU, she would be unable to influence EU decisions that vitally concern

her. He stressed that this and other pro-EU arguments must be vociferously advanced in discussions with Poland's Euroskeptics.

Marcin Przeworski stipulated that he would address matters regarding the role of the Catholic Church and other Polish Christian communities in the present historic phase of European integration. He then spoke to three issues: 1) the Church in Poland prior to the referendum, 2) the Church's input into the discussion on the future constitutional treaty, and 3) what the Church in Poland can offer Europe after the expansion of the EU.

Przeworski stressed that the Church favors European integration and that on numerous occasions both the Polish Episcopacy and Pope John Paul II have expressed their support for the continent's unity. He recalled the Pope's homily from 1979, when in Gniezno - Poland's historic first capital - the Pope spoke of his mission as a Slavic pope to help unite Europe's East and West. Przeworski also noted that the Vatican for 18 years has maintained a secretariat in Brussels through which it ceaselessly conducts discussion and dialogue with the institutions of the EU. He added that the Polish Episcopacy has issued formal documents supporting European integration, most recently on March 20, 2002. Przeworski went on to say, however, that the Church would not instruct its members on how to vote in Poland's June referendum.

On Europe's potential constitution Przeworski said that the Church favors reference to Europe's Christian heritage. He went on to express support for guarantees of religious freedom and the identity of particular churches in national laws and said that they should also be included at the European level in the constitutional proposals. He then argued that the *invocatio Dei* as formulated in the Polish Constitution, treated as a model for Europe's eventual *invocatio Dei*, would by no means represent a device for the Christianization of Europe, but rather a confirmation of the role of religious believers in the construction of Europe and of the churches as important partners in dialogue.

On Poland's spiritual input into Europe Przeworski seemed somewhat at a loss, stressing rather the fears and anxieties Polish Catholics feel toward activity in Western Europe. Thus, he called for a "Copernican revolution" in the consciousness of Polish Catholics.

In the discussion period Wojciech Wierzbicki lamented the fact that Poland's experience in the Polish-Lithuanian Union was not being used to win support for the EU. He also said that once in the EU, Poland's agricultural sector might lose its "state instinct", adding that such is already lacking, especially in Warsaw. He then quipped that Poland's decline began with moving the capital from Krakow to

Warsaw in 1596. Lastly, Wierzbicki noted with regret that the current Primate of Poland has not continued many of the moral-building activities of Primate Wyszyński (r. 1948-1981).

With Krystyna Jagiełło having noted that the Baltic States are oriented toward Scandinavia and Marek Pernal that the Visegrad Group has waned into possible irrelevance, Tadeusz Mazowiecki argued that Poland does not have fixed allies in Europe *per se*, but that such alliances are to be dynamically cultivated in regard to specific issues.

Antoni Kukliński cautioned that Poland's accession to the EU is not at all to be taken for granted. He reminded those present that at the time of the Peace of Westphalia, when other European nations began to build modern states, Poland not only refused to follow their lead, but four years later ratified the *liberum veto*. He added that as then, so today would Russia be the beneficiary of a June 2003 *liberum veto*. He went on to stress that the destruction of the Polish state is underway and suggested that membership in the EU is an important way to salvage it.

Jacek Czaputowicz

## **The English School Of International Relations And Its Approach To The European Integration**

Jacek Czaputowicz writes that at the close of the 1990s interest rose in the English School of international relations. Important authors from that school (ones like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, C.A.W. Manning, and John Vincent) formulated the category of the international society and applied it to the analysis of international relations. Czaputowicz explains that efforts are presently underway to rejuvenate that school. Thus, Czaputowicz sets out to portray the theoretical oeuvre of the English School of international relations and to appraise its impact upon the development of theories of international relations. He presents its genesis at the end of the 1950s, its purview, and main thinkers, and then he describes the category of the international society against a backdrop of other forms of international relations.

Czaputowicz explains that a characteristic feature of the English School is the conjoining of elements proper to numerous currents. He writes that Richard Little is correct in arguing that there is no valid reason to treat the three traditions distinguished by Martin Wight, i.e., realism, rationalism, and revolutionism, as

variant, much less rival visions of international relations. For they are not coherent theories but traditions that represent three aspects of international relations that can be drawn from with real profit. Realists, Czaputowicz writes, concentrate on the political conditions of anarchy, as they consider it to be a permanent feature of international relations; rationalists focus their attention on diplomacy and trade, as they believe that those institutions can soften the effects of anarchy; and revolutionists are interested in how sovereign states create the moral and cultural space with which to overcome the effects of anarchy. Czaputowicz explains that rationalism for Wight was a civilizing factor, revolutionism a rejuvenating one, and realism a controlling and disciplining factor. His views evolved over time from realism through rationalism and to revolutionism. This pluralism of traditions, one common for the majority of authors hailing from the English School, has prompted some researchers to voice the opinion that representatives of the English School have not created a coherent theoretical concept, and that for this reason it is difficult to challenge their premises, Czaputowicz states.

Czaputowicz observes that the English School has been of undoubted service in that, through its unique grasp of the historical evolution of the international community and novel understanding of political thought, it has provided an alternative (with regard to realism) interpretation of international relations. For its proponents have clearly demonstrated that the international system has existed in a variety of forms in history. Unlike the realists, Czaputowicz stresses, who saw a fixed form for the international system, adherents of the English School grasped the changing forms extending from that of independent states to centralized empires, and the international society. This view, Czaputowicz suggests, is empowering in that it allows positive change to the current system. In this sense, he points out, the English School is less English than it may otherwise seem. Indeed, it is altogether European and shares premises with such authors as Raymond Aron, Michel Merle, and Luigi Bonante. It furthermore is characterized by the protest against the domination of American authors, whose thinking does not always gel with Europeans', inasmuch as Europe's geopolitical situation differs from that of the US. This, Czaputowicz writes, may well help us understand why American writers from the realist school greatly concern themselves with power politics, whereas European adherents of the English School are more inclined to address the moral aspects of the current and future development of the international arena.

Czaputowicz signals that the efforts to reinvigorate the English School of international relations are accompanied by the attempt to formulate a new research program. He writes that in Barry Buzan's view said research should focus

on the tension between the various levels of the international community (global, subregional, regional), on the classification of types of international communities (imperial, Westphalian, medieval), on war and the balance of power in the international community, on the history of the international community, ethics, international law, intervention and the international community, and - last but not least - analysis of the school itself. Czaputowicz explains that these proposals imply greater interest in the European Union as a concrete example of a highly developed international society.

Czaputowicz then addresses the question of just what kind of international society the European Union is. He relates that Buzan, who takes a Kantian view, maintains that the emergence of an international society occurs as a result of the homogenization and convergence of subjects. Czaputowicz then questions this view, arguing that European integration has progressed not only through the process of member-states having come to resemble one another, but also through the transfer of competencies (i.e., aspects of their sovereignty) to the supranational level. This, he stresses, introduces a new quality.

Another matter Czaputowicz addresses is that the relation of the English School to other theoretical currents, especially constructivism, requires clarification. The question at once arises, Czaputowicz stresses, as to whether or not constructivism, in its recognition that the identities and interests of subjects in the international arena are the result of a social process, better explains a range of phenomena on the international stage, if only to mention the process of European integration. Of particular research relevance in this regard would seem the elucidation of the relations between the international society and the world society. What this entails, Czaputowicz explains, is the question of whether or not the development of the world society threatens the international society through its undermining of the nation-state - or whether it strengthens the international society by providing it with a shared normative structure upon which it will be able to further develop. This question also reveals the tension between the **pluralist** and **solidarist** perception of the international society, Czaputowicz writes. And this tension is difficult to reconcile, he adds, in that pluralism, with its accent on distinctiveness, leads in the direction of realism - whereas solidarist, stipulating integration, heads in the direction of revolutionism. Thus, Czaputowicz writes, what should most reasonably be expected is not a synergy of these two currents identified with the founders of the school Hedley Bull and Martin Wight, but their parting.

Drawing his analysis to a close, Czaputowicz writes that the many who challenge the English School's relevance in describing European integration may

well be right. He notes, for instance, that the balance of power has little applicability in Europe, where the push to integration counteracts the creation of antagonistic camps of the kind that appeared in the interwar period. In his concluding remarks Czaputowicz explains that diplomacy has a different meaning in the EU, and that the requirement of accepting the *acquis communautaire* as a further institution of international society falls outside the purview of the English School.

Katarzyna Żukrowska

### **The Application Of Theories Of Integration In European Practice**

Professor Katarzyna Żukrowska writes that in the period following World War II, European integration was initially to have proceeded in the political and military spheres. Nonetheless, France channeled integration onto the economic track, for political integration seemed too huge a challenge, Żukrowska writes. What was postulated was that joint economic interests and undertakings would set into motion a process that would propel itself forward all the way to political integration. Moreover, it was understood that the interdependence achieved through political integration, i.e., through intermediate institutional forms, could be withdrawn from at any juncture. Economic integration, however, was to be an irreversible process, Żukrowska explains. Both of these concepts - economic integration and political integration - were supported by contemporary theories, parts of which remain valid to this day.

Żukrowska writes that the theory of European integration is a reflection or perhaps embodiment of many theories and intellectual premises which back in the 1950s and 60s few people believed in. For it was then assumed, she explains, that such theories cannot be implemented into practice: it then seemed doubtful that they could be utilized as a real means of impacting neighboring countries, much less as a form of drawing together the economies of Germany and France. Żukrowska then poses a series of questions that regard in particular the institutional solutions necessary at various stages of deepening economic integration. She then asks others concerning political integration and whether or not new superstructures are to supplant older, national ones. Here Żukrowska reviews the relevant ideas of such political scientists as Karl Deutch, Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, and Pentland before going on to contrast such concrete examples

as the EU - which is a result of the creation of new structures and legal changes - and NAFTA, which has not developed together with an institutional and administrative superstructure.

Focusing on the EU's emergence, Żukrowska describes three concepts that were operative within the thinking of Europe's architects. The first is functionalism as espoused by David Mitrany, i.e., that a government's basic purpose should be to meet the needs of society. The second is federalism, as propounded in the phrase "United States of Europe". Europe's federalists sought constitutional solutions, believing that this presented a rational means for establishing international relations and for eliminating the threat of conflict. Transactionism, in turn, as most notably espoused by Karl Deutch, postulates a pluralist approach that fosters a multiplicity of ties between societies and precludes war as a means of settling disputes. Indeed, all three of these theories had the objective of doing away with warfare, and all three explicitly sought a concept for Europe's collective security that would transcend the nation-state.

In reviewing the early postwar years and the beginnings of European integration Żukrowska characterizes neofunctionalism, the problems with categorizing Monnet along the lines of the above theories, and the impetus toward integration spawned by the onset of the Cold War. Żukrowska writes that the Marshall Plan became an instrument promoting European cooperation and led to the creation of the OEEC - and that it was generally accepted that political integration would have to follow incremental economic integration. Hereafter Professor Żukrowska recounts the course of deepening European integration from the Coal and Steel Community created in 1951. She notes along the way the early fiasco caused by France's sinking of the European Defense Community in 1954, and takes us up to the Nice Treaty of December 2000.

Concluding her analysis, Żukrowska reiterates that although theories on integration did not once enjoy much clout among experts, nonetheless today we may see their marked effects. They emboldened Europe's early architects to opt for a proper core for European integration and empowered them in their search for suitable and lasting solutions. Their remarkable success, Professor Żukrowska writes, is to have enabled the melding of Europe's economies - and to have enabled the efforts to create a European constitution and commence the challenge of political integration.

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# International Security

## Global Terrorism - Iraq - American Responsibility and Europe

*Talkshop held by the "Polska w Europie" Foundation, October 3, 2002*

Zygmunt Skórzyński commenced the *Talkshop* stating that seldom was a *Talkshop's* topics so very much in the eye of the storm. He explained that the looming crisis over Iraq would directly or indirectly impact not only peace in the Middle East, not only the matter of America's global security responsibilities, but also relations between the US and Europe, the future of NATO, the European Union's internal relations, and its relations with Russia. He then thanked the eminent experts Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz and General Stanisław Koziej for having agreed to speak and turned the *Talkshop* over to its moderator, Jacek Czaputowicz.

Czaputowicz remarked on the intended focuses of the *Talkshop* and then noted that it was taking place only weeks after the important meeting of NATO defense ministers held in Warsaw, at which time it was proposed that NATO create new strike forces for use in the war against terrorism. He explained that such forces - to number over twenty thousand and to be ready within two to four years - would represent a qualitative and historic change in NATO's mission. Czaputowicz quoted Donald Rumsfeld, who while in Warsaw had said, "if NATO will not have rapid reaction forces and effective units at its disposal, ones that can be deployed within days or weeks rather than within months or years, then NATO will be incapable of offering the world anything in the 21st century". Czaputowicz said that this statement went to the heart of the problem: either NATO will take up the challenge or it will sentence itself to irrelevance.

Czaputowicz then turned to Europe's role in the world and vis-a-vis the US. He asked, what role does Europe see for itself? Reflecting on Germany's recent elections Czaputowicz asked, will Europe cower in order not to become a target of terrorist attacks? And what about Poland?, he asked. He stated that the NATO meeting in Warsaw had made obvious the fact that Poland is the US's closest ally in this part of Europe. What role should Poland play in the quarrel between Germany and the US? - perhaps that of mediator? Or perhaps Poland should stand aback from the problem?

Janusz Onyszkiewicz began his remarks by noting that for some fifty years following the Second World War the United States had pursued a policy of containment and deterrence. Such accorded with the times, he said, ones that

compelled a defensive and reactive posture. Onyszkiewicz then stated that today, however, the United States recognizes as the guiding principle of its policy the readiness to act preemptively, that is, not only in response to aggression. The question that at once emerges, Onyszkiewicz said, is how does the US intend to pursue that policy and how will that effect the international stage. He then said that the UN Security Council was to fulfill the role of maintaining peace in the world and of eliminating threats to peace - yet today the US wishes to have a sovereign right to conduct military operations without a UN mandate. Here Onyszkiewicz recalled the discussion at NATO's recent meeting over whether or not out-of-area NATO operations would require UN sanction. He then stated that the scale of the present danger was such that the US sees itself as the sheriff who has to force a showdown with the gang of bandits who are terrorizing the town. No one wants to help, though most whisper their support. That, Onyszkiewicz said, is how he saw the conflict over Iraq. He then remarked on President Bush's intention not merely to disarm Saddam Hussein, but to overthrow the regime.

Onyszkiewicz then forecast the possibility of a "soft" resolution at the UN, one that would place new demands on Saddam but would not represent an ultimatum. He went on to speculate on the voting in support of the US at the Security Council.

Turning to US-NATO relations, Onyszkiewicz called it a mistake for NATO to have invoked Article 5 inasmuch as NATO was not in a position to take a commanding position in military action. He also commented on the anti-climax that swiftly followed, noting that Article 5 was to have meant the instant marshalling of all of NATO's forces for decisive warfare. That did not happen, he pointed out, recounting the case of Canadian statements promising the instant withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in the case of combat. He closed his remarks by asking whether or not Europe was at all in a position to maintain its embrace of America with the arms of NATO.

General Stanisław Koziej stated that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had opened a new chapter in security theory and practice. This change, he said, is most visible in the United States, which has committedly and methodically been constructing the bases of its new security strategy. Here he commented on the creation of the Homeland Security Department and the review of national security strategies and readiness. General Koziej went on to argue that Poland, too, should create integrated civilian-military structures capable of maintaining security and responding to threats. He called this the most important lesson of 9/11. On American national security Koziej explained that the new doctrines all revolve about two threats, namely those of terrorism and those of the spread of weapons

of mass destruction. Koziej stated that in the struggle against these threats America is prepared to go it alone, and to do so preemptively.

Koziej then observed that America's new strategic policies have dynamized the security discussions in NATO. This, he said, was plain in NATO's plans for rapid reaction, i.e., expeditionary forces. Here Koziej noted that the silent agreement to Rumsfeld's proposals entailed an admission of error at the Washington Summit. Koziej explained that in recent years NATO had done all it could to forestall the creation of expeditionary forces, and that Rumsfeld's proposals had thus shown the solutions hitherto implemented to be inadequate. Koziej went on to express his support for NATO to adopt a preparedness to act globally and he called for Poland to do its part in devising creative solutions and in providing real military contributions - both qualitatively and quantitatively.

General Koziej then turned his thoughts to the issue of war against Iraq, stating his belief that war was inevitable. He added that the war would reflect a synthesis of recent strategic experience and would not be a repetition of the 1991 war. He expressed his own support for a war of escalation, whereby ever greater, deadlier, and costlier force is used to achieve the goal of regime change in Baghdad. He then forecast three stages toward that end: the first to remove Saddam from power through a reliance on special forces. The second would involve the use of land forces that would strike deeply and swiftly into central Iraq and preclude the takeover of the country by opposition forces. Koziej explained that the third stage would entail the massive invasion of Iraq. Such an escalation would optimally balance the opportunities and risks in the Iraqi crisis, he said. But Koziej said all would have to wait several months to find out whether or not this would be the chosen scenario.

In the question and answer session Jerzy Jedlicki asked why were containment and deterrence suitable policies vis-à-vis the USSR, but not toward Iraq? General Koziej responded that the logical difference is that during the Cold War America did not have the capability of a first-strike that would prevent the Soviets from launching a counter-attack. What then deterred both camps was MAD - the certainty of mutually assured destruction. In cases like Iraq, Koziej explained, asymmetry allows for preemptive strikes against what are nonetheless real threats.

Jarosław Bratkiewicz noted that whereas the Soviet threat was a known quantity and could be addressed through diplomatic channels, the threat posed by terrorists is by definition unpredictable and anonymous.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz stated that Iraq is believed to have some twenty to sixty rockets capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. He argued that if Iraq is

permitted to build more such rockets (or other such delivery systems), the threat will of course increase. Onyszkiewicz also noted that Iraq may be willing to sell its WMD to terrorist groups and added that Iraq's ambitions to become the regional hegemon remain obvious, such that - bearing in mind that country's track record - the Iraqi threat need not be trivialized.

Tadeusz Chabiera questioned the soundness of Poland's willingness to support the US in a preemptive attack on Iraq and scoffed at President Kwaśniewski's "unbounded trust" for President Bush.

Wojciech Wierzbicki first expressed his failure to see anything new in terrorism as such, then his concerns over a dangerous rise in Arab nationalism in response to a war against Iraq, and finally his feeling that Poland's stocks were declining - and Russia's rising.

Antoni Kukliński seconded Wierzbicki and voiced his general pessimism over the outcome of war against Iraq. He pointed to the American reluctance to pursue nation-building in Afghanistan and then predicted negative consequences for the world economy in the wake of war. Lastly he labeled the crisis over Iraq an ideological conflict between the Western and Islamic worlds.

Ryszard Turski expressed his concern over the course of the discussion so far. He stated that the arguments being used against Bush were the same as those once used to buttress American isolationism under FDR, when Europe was already at war. Nonetheless, he questioned the appropriateness of analogies, stating that the attacks of 9/11 had introduced a new quality. Turski also inverted the question of what would follow war against Iraq by asking, what would follow the refusal to act? His answer was that the creation of global terrorist organizations would intensify. He added that the present difficulties reflected the deep crisis in the UN - and in NATO, as well.

Beata Jagiełło stated that President Bush had reacted to the attacks of 9/11 improperly, and suggested that he should have shown Christian mercy. She added that Poles still do not understand the "sophisticated philosophy" that Europe's foreign policy rests upon.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz stated that America has been attacked and is thus at war. Europeans do not share that sense. He then added that recent events have powerfully demonstrated that Europe does not in fact have a foreign policy - and in fact has less and less of a semblance of one. Onyszkiewicz then expressed his displeasure at Kwaśniewski's statement for the German press, that Poland would fight in Iraq alongside America and Britain. Onyszkiewicz said that in his view Poland should keep a distance from making such statements and should consult

all declarations with her partners in the EU. Notwithstanding this, Onyszkiewicz stated that Poland is capable of performing a role in Iraq - both financially and organizationally. He stressed that Poland's participation would incur high costs, but it would not ruin the country's finances.

General Koziej wondered if Poland's offer would be significant enough to even be accepted by the US. He then stated that criticism of American policies was widespread, but he noted that he was not hearing alternative proposals in the war against terrorism. In the face of terrorism, the worst possible scenario, he said, would be that of passivity. For this reason, Koziej said, he called for a proactive approach to American proposals and critical debate on them.

Krystian Piątkowski

### **Poland's Arms Industry At The Crossroads**

Expert on military affairs Krystian Piątkowski, alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, begins his exhaustive analysis by writing that four years after Poland's admission to NATO, and just one year before the country's anticipated accession to the European Union, questions on Poland's arms industry have become more urgent than ever. The fourteen years that have passed since Poland commenced her systemic transformation have not led to the decisive changes that have been implemented in other sectors of the economy, he states. Piątkowski explains that the general condition of the arms industry has been steadily deteriorating and that there still has been no formulation of a long-term strategic vision for its future. In the meantime, Poland's deepening political and economic integration with the Euro-Atlantic region will bring about a situation in which Poland's domestic producers of weaponry and military equipment will be faced with dilemmas poised at their very existence. Piątkowski then sets out to present what he calls his "subjective appraisal" of the causes behind this state of affairs before turning to prognoses and guidelines for the future development of Poland's arms industry.

Piątkowski sketches the emergence of modern Poland's arms industry from its communist past, noting that - but for jet fighters and armored personal carriers, guided air-borne missiles, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, large ships, and specialist naval equipment, Poland's arms industry manufactured the whole remaining, vast array of weapons and weapons systems, from helicopters and tanks to smaller naval vessels and hand-held weapons. He stressed that of all of

this - not only ownership, but establishing parameters, production levels, trade, etc. - was under the absolute control of the state. Thus, at the moment when Poland entered her new realities in 1989, the country's arms industry produced an impressive arsenal of weaponry for its size, though technological standards were not so impressive.

Piątkowski calls what began in the early 1990s in Poland's arms industry a "catastrophe". He recounts how orders, both foreign and domestic, at once plummeted, adding that from 1988 until the March, 2003 agreement to purchase F-16s, Poland purchased not a single fighter plane. Moreover, Piątkowski adds, between 1989 and 1997 Poland's defense outlays fell by over 43%. Relatedly, in the overlapping period of 1991-1997 employment in the arms industry plunged from 135 thousand to 71 thousand. By 2001 that number had further plunged to 35 thousand. This "chaotic" situation, he writes, was further compounded by the fact that successive governments continued to shuffle military priorities and failed to devise a consistent purchase system. This set of problems was not remedied until Poland joined NATO and began to take part in Allied defense planning. Piątkowski observes that the Polish Armed Services' developmental program for 2001-2006 entails an important step in the direction of real improvement.

Piątkowski then describes the essential passivity of Poland's arms industry, most glaringly seen, he writes, in the areas of marketing and promotion. He explains that this largely results from the fact that management practices and procedures from the former system continue to dominate. Piątkowski then describes the arms industry's overly ambitious (read: unrealistic) R&D programs in the mid-90s and the failure to develop foreign partnerships. Thereafter he presents an analysis of the reforms led by specific defense ministry teams, beginning with the Klimek-Ogryczak tandem of the early AWS-UW coalition government that took power in 1997, then taking up the SLD-PSL period that began in 2001 with the Szarawski-Kaczmarek strategy.

At this point in his study Piątkowski turns to the changes underway in the arms industry around the world. He notes the tendencies toward consolidation, privatization, and forging international partnerships, before turning to matters related to the technological revolutions changing the face of warfare. He also describes the impact this is having on R&D programs.

Returning to Poland, Piątkowski next addresses the possibilities for changes for the better in Poland's arms industry. He notes that, like a host of other countries, Poland is unable to produce on her own any complex weapons system at an affordable price. This fact argues in favor of deepening international

partnerships. Piątkowski also reviews the need for the state itself to redefine its role vis-à-vis the arms industry, especially along the lines of fostering privatization and consolidation. He thereafter calls for the acceptance of modern management practices and evaluates the promise of offset contracts to bring powerful boosts to the arms industry. Piątkowski's concluding point to his lengthy analysis is that the improvement of the arms industry's condition requires not only a restructuring of the sector itself, but also fundamental change in the principles and procedures relevant to its primary client - the Polish Armed Forces.

## On a Fourth Pillar for the European Union

Dominik Morawski

### **The Realm Of Custom And Culture: Poland's Presence In The Process Of European Integration**

Dominik Morawski, who has recently returned to Poland after long years in Rome, begins his remarks by observing that - unlike Italians, who have settled accounts with their fascist past - Poles have yet to squarely face their communist past.

Morawski then states that foreigners visiting Poland are often struck by the monologic character of exchange in Poland. He writes that foreigners typically report that Poles will at length speak to them in rich detail about Polish matters, but strikingly seldom take the opportunity to learn about the countries their guest comes from. Morawski characterizes this as so many wasted chances, suggesting that this in part, at least, stems from the fact that Poles are insufficiently able to bridge to people of differing nationality, ethnicity, religion, worldview, etc. - that they are lacking what the Italians call *arie di convivere*.

Morawski goes on to highlight European culture's moorings in Christianity and carefully stresses Pope John Paul II's promulgation of that message in the context of European integration. He also reviews important initiatives of Italy's Christian-Democrats and the de Gasperi Foundation. Lastly, Morawski holds out the hope that Poland will be able to find a proper formula for an *invocatio Dei* for Europe's constitution.

Antoni Kukliński

### **A Fourth Or A First Pillar For The European Union?**

Professor Antoni Kukliński states that the initiative of the Polish Council For The European Movement to create a fourth pillar for the European Union deserves full support. He writes that it should be pressed forward in the style of American General George Patton, in an offensive of Polish thinking that should strike out along three fronts.

The first front entails the struggle that Poland become an active participant in thinking on Europe as a whole, that Polish political and intellectual elites never fear speaking out in a clear voice on Europe's future, that Poles never accept that Europe's future is a realm belonging exclusively to the Germans, French, and British. Kukliński states that Poland's appeal for a fourth pillar is proof that Poles are capable of addressing Europe's pressing issues.

The second front Kukliński describes is that of the European Union's evolving role on the global stage. In this sense, Kukliński argues, science, education, and culture do not represent the fourth, but the first pillar. They are no superstructure, but the very basis of creating and uplifting Europe's place in the world.

The third such front is that of the struggle for the future of the Polish avant-garde - ever trodden on by the arrogance and ignorance of Polish backwaters.

Concluding his remarks, Professor Kukliński declares that education, science, and culture must be redefined not only as the first pillar of the European Union, but as the first pillar of the *Rzeczpospolita Polska* in the 21st century. He adds that none of this is utopian. Rather, it may be said to represent an attempt to adopt the marvelous attainments the Fins may well be so proud of.