
English Summary

Edited and translated by Philip Earl Steele

From the editors:

This issue of *Polska w Europie*, dominated as it is by careful and realistic appraisals of the inner workings, meanings, and failings of the European Union, bespeaks the fact that Poland has headed into the bell-lap. For not only is Poland about to conclude her negotiations on membership in the European Union: Polish delegates to Europe's Constitutional Convention are committedly laboring to devise practical means and models for a better - and bigger - Europe of tomorrow.

Thus, as Poles envision their new role in Europe with ever-greater clarity, their list of desiderata has become more sensitive and more defined. To highlight this fact, we have framed the papers and articles of this issue with ones that express the Polish wish to "breathe life into the machine". This is the message both of our first article - on "A community of tradition and values" - and of our last two - appeals for a fourth pillar for the European Union.

The first of the articles and papers thus framed provide a detailed examination of the future of European defense (Piątkowski), Russia's changing relationship with NATO (Chłoń), and EU assistance programs for Poland's local governments and NGOs (Mrówka). In the next thematic block we are honored to publish a paper on Europe's future by Danuta Hübner, one of Poland's delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Thereafter the reader will find a text on Poland's European challenges (Jesień) and the transcript of our Talkshop on the Convention (Barcz, Czaputowicz, Kulakowski). The last block is on the course

and aftermath of Germany's elections, with articles by Grzybowska, Miszczak, and the transcript of our Talkshop on the expulsion controversy with Władysław Bartoszewski and Artur Hajnicz.

Studies and Analyses

Bogusław Trzeciak SJ, Marcin Przewczewski

A community of tradition and values: Europe seen through the prism and work of the Church

Father Bogusław Trzeciak SJ, director of OCIPE in Warsaw and Marcin Przewczewski, director of KAI (the Catholic Information Agency) begin their paper by asking, will Poles feel at home only once they will have joined the European Union? Perhaps not, they suggest, calling upon a range of opinion studies conducted within the EU which indicate that a majority of Europeans long to live in a society shaped by and infused with traditional values. Indeed, they write, eight of ten Europeans place a premium on participation in building a better society. Inasmuch as Christianity remains a significant touchstone in discussions on Europe's universal and unique values, they state, the voice of Christians is to be heard in matters of Europe's common good, solidarity, and responsibility for upholding the dignity of the individual.

The authors stress that the development of European civilization and the rise and legacy of Christendom are by no means one and the same. Nonetheless, over most of the past two millennia they have been largely inseparable. Moreover, Trzeciak and Przewczewski explain, the Church has been and remains a centrally relevant champion of European unity - whether that is to consider the efforts of Pope Sylvester II (999-1003), Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), or, it should go without saying, the tireless pan-European exertions of Pope John Paul II. Here the authors highlight the Pope's vision of Europe as a "community of spirit", and how he has always distanced himself from visions of Europe that rest merely upon economic and political criteria, not upon European humanism. Trzeciak and Przewczewski thereafter quote the Pope's enumeration of the key elements of European humanism, to wit, "the dignity of the individual; the sacred character of human life; the central place of the family based upon marriage; the importance of education; freedom of thought,

speech, conviction, and religion; the legal protection of groups and individuals; the cooperation of all on behalf of the common good; work recognized as a personal and societal good; political power conceived as service, subject to law and to reason and “checked” by the rights of individuals and nations”.

The authors extrapolate from this that the Pope opposes the post-Enlightenment posture that would limit religious freedom to the private sphere. And they are quick to observe that just such a “naked public square”, something not intended by Europe’s Fathers, is today an issue of ever more urgent redress in Europe. Trzeciak and Przewozniak here go on to review the set of Church institutions present and at work in Brussels; thereafter they sketch the range of models for church-state relations extending from the radical French model to the accommodationist American one. As an example of a sticking point in the EU’s relationship with religious communities, the authors discuss the debate over including an *invocatio Dei* in the EU’s Charter of Basic Rights and the Charter’s failure to protect life from conception to natural death.

Turning to the Church in Poland, Trzeciak and Przewozniak stress its important work in supporting Polish aspirations to participate in European integration and achieve Poland’s membership in the European Union. Here the authors highlight the November 2001 visit of Primate Glemp in Brussels, when he met with EU commissioner Günter Verheugen and declared Poland’s integration into Europe “a historical necessity”. They then emphasize the importance of the Polish Episcopacy’s undertakings to quell the anti-EU sentiments fanned by nominally Catholic press agencies that see Masonic conspiracies in the efforts to integrate Europe.

Drawing upon the words of Pope John Paul II, Father Trzeciak and director Przewozniak conclude their article by stressing Poland’s potential input into the uniting Europe in providing testimony to the viability of spiritual values in Europe’s broadening public square.

Krystian Piątkowski

The Future of European Defense

Krystian Piątkowski, alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, writes that a series of factors - i.e., new challenges, deepening EU integration, differences between the European members of NATO and the US - have prompted EU politicians to make often repeated declarations as to the need for

Europe to dynamize the process of creating a uniform European Security and Defense Policy - ESDP. But what, Piątkowski asks, has been done toward end? What obstacles have been encountered - and how to deal with them? What is the most appropriate defense goal for the upcoming decades? These are the questions Piątkowski focuses on in his paper.

Piątkowski begins to answer his questions by noting how very slowly Europe has moved toward security and defense integration. Moreover, he stresses that the attacks of 9/11 have made abundantly evident the exigency to develop both maximally elastic rapid-reaction forces as well as decision-centers capable of responding effectively in changing circumstances. The goal, he states, is to rid the European economic colossus of its clay feet, that is, to provide it with the political and military power appropriate to its wealth. But it would be a huge mistake, he cautions, to construct such power in opposition to the US.

Piątkowski writes that the basis of the European Union's functional defense remains that of the traditional principle of national sovereignty in defense matters. He notes that this principle was questioned only once, i.e., in the context of security debates conducted during the creation of NATO over half a century ago.

Today, he goes on, though the EU continues to declare ambitious security goals, defense outlays over the past dozen years have steadily declined. Today, Piątkowski reports, Europe's NATO countries are spending nearly 30 billion dollars less than in 1990. Nor in that time have they significantly rationalized defense expenditures, he adds. What this has led to is a markedly widening gap between the US and Europe in military capabilities. Expanding on this point, Piątkowski writes that Europe's organizational and structural defense circumstances require each country to have its own, separate command, procurement, and logistical systems. This leads to relative bureaucratization and also encumbers matters regarding interoperability, the emergence of a European strategic potential, and integrated intelligence gathering. Concluding this point, Piątkowski observes that in Europe's present situation there is little reason to think defense outlays will rise: the only realistic hope is for rationalization.

By 2003 the EU's rapid reaction forces are to achieve full operational status, Piątkowski reminds. Nonetheless, he adds, this is but the first step in Europe's redefinition of its defense identity. What further awaits Europe, Piątkowski, stresses is 1) the development of forces capable of meeting and countering new threats; 2) carrying out a quantum leap in defense technology; 3) the introduction of a new, elastic model of managing military resources; and 4) the elaboration of a new model for the military's relationship with society. After having

detailedly explored these points Piątkowski states that their attainment will enter the realm of the possible only once the EU decides upon military integration. In this regard, he writes, the surrender of national military forces will represent the final act in the process of Europe's federalization. In the meantime, a partial avenue leading toward closer integration may well be had in the idea of national specialization within the framework of an otherwise united defense system.

Piątkowski then takes up a detailed description of several basic problems of a politico-military nature, without which any vision of Europe's future is incomplete. Among those problems he pays most special attention to 1) Europe's recruitment model, 2) ESDP-NATO relations, and 3) the issue of Europe's nuclear weapons. Concerning recruitment Piątkowski comes out in favor of professional armies for the reason of their superior training, utility, and society's acceptance of possible losses. The drawback of volunteer armies he addresses is that of the inability to rapidly increase troop levels in the event of a conflict's dramatic escalation. Here he touches on the US's National Guard forces as a model for maintaining reserve forces. Piątkowski next argues against "strategic divorce", noting that Europe and America's civilizational and economic ties are without parallel in the world, such that any weakening of NATO would be a grave mistake. In this regard Piątkowski calls for an overhaul of Europe's defense identity with a view to achieving a maximum level of partnership with the US. Taking up the issue of nuclear weapons, Piątkowski suggests that it is altogether unlikely that France and the UK - who do not, after all, see eye to eye on EU integration - will soon be willing to surrender their national control over their nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe.

Turning to Poland's place in European defense, Piątkowski first observes that whereas Poland possesses NATO's eighth largest troop levels (178,000 soldiers), her per-capita military spending is the lowest in the Alliance. In light of the fact that this is unlikely to change in the near-term, Piątkowski explains that Poland's military specialization cannot be capital-intensive. What Europe may reasonably expect of Poland is a large territorial defense component along with rapid-reaction forces suitable for expeditionary missions, he states. This latter, he argues, is indeed thrust upon Poland by financial circumstances: Poland cannot afford highly advanced technical systems, but can develop highly specialized personnel - particularly GROM forces, Search and Rescue (SAR) units, and the corps of engineers and sappers. Piątkowski postulates that ultimately such forces as these could be incorporated directly into European rapid-reaction forces. This, he concludes, poses an opportunity Poland dare not fail to seize.

Tomasz Chłoń

Russia drawing nearer to NATO

Tomasz Chłoń, from Poland's NATO Representative Office, attempts to place the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), penned May 28, 2002 in Pratica di Mare outside Rome, within the context of the chapter of NATO-Russia cooperation commenced in May 1997 with the Founding Act. He stresses, however, that there are important differences between the NRC and its predecessor (the PJC, Permanent Joint Council), especially in that now Russia has a place in NATO's deliberations as a twentieth, coequal member.

Chłoń writes that it was the changes wrought by the terrorist attacks on America that enabled a reevaluation of the Alliance's cooperation with Russia. For NATO and Russian leaders at once raced to emphasize their community of interests and play down their differences. US leaders were quick to notice the attractiveness of Russia as a partner in securing nuclear security, in the war against terrorism, and as an alternative source of energy supplies. The closing of ties between Washington and Russia further fostered a rapprochement between Brussels and Moscow.

Much of the credit for deepening NATO-Russia cooperation is due to the initiative of Tony Blair, whose government on November 15 submitted a letter on reformulating NATO-Russian relations to the heads of state of all 19 NATO countries and to Russia on the same day; that is, he did not wait for the 19 to hammer out a joint communiqué at any lengthy NATO forum, but addressed Russia directly as a NATO equal.

Chłoń next takes note of how the Founding Act and the NRC were constituted in similar circumstances. Both, he points out, were signed one year before NATO summits scheduled to expand the Alliance. They were also both preceded by six rounds of negotiations. Chłoń goes on to describe in detail the negotiation process leading up the establishment of the NRC, highlighting the many reservations the Russians voiced. For instance, the Russians explained that they were unclear as to the real differences between the newly proposed council and the PJC in that 1) NATO member-countries were to retain their power to coordinate internal positions, 2) there was to be no guarantee that NATO would not conduct operations without Russian approval (as in Yugoslavia), and 3) the newly proposed council was not to be suitably built up organizationally.

Once the new council was constituted, Chłoń continues, a multi-pronged cooperation program drawn up by the Twenty's foreign ministers in Reykjavik

was commenced. It focused on 1) the war against terrorism, 2) crisis management, 3) preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, 4) arms control and trust-building, 5) Theater Missile Defense, 6) maritime Search and Rescue operations, 7) military cooperation, 8) military reform, and 9) new threats and challenges. This program began in an atmosphere of high expectations and the determination to treat Russia like a true partner, the 19 no longer first coming up with a unified position. What lies ahead, Chłoń cautions, is hard to foresee, as NATO-Russia relations do not exist in a vacuum, but within a complex tangle of relations, among which the most significant are those between the US and Russia, the EU and Russia, and within the Alliance itself. The hope, of course, is that NATO-Russian cooperation will steadily deepen. However, Chłoń writes that even the most foresighted analysts, for instance those at RAND, do not foretell a time when cooperation with Russia will become NATO's *raison d'être*. What seem most probable in NATO-Russian cooperation, Chłoń states, are the three following scenarios: 1) a steady, slow but sure deepening of ties that over a period of from ten to twenty years will lead to Russian membership in NATO; 2) a sudden, dramatic closing instigated by international crisis (such as a conflict between India and Pakistan); 3) an erosion of cooperation caused by events within the Russian Federation or in the international situation (e.g., Iraq). Chłoń stresses that the first variant is not only the most desirable, but also the most likely.

Closing his paper with a view to Poland's role in all this, Chłoń strongly emphasizes that despite press reports to the contrary, Poland has been and remains actively in favor of deepening NATO's cooperation with Russia. He holds out the hope that Poland's geopolitical position will become of ever greater relevance, not least of which through Poland's pro-activity in the NRC.

Barbara Mrówka

EU Assistance Programs for Polish Local Authorities and NGOs in the Preaccession Period

Barbara Mrówka writes that when Poland and the European Communities signed the Europe Agreement (December 16, 1991; effective date February 1, 1994), and the Interim Agreement on trade began to be implemented on March 1, 1992, the European Communities committed themselves to long-term economic and political cooperation with Poland, as well as to providing Poland

with financial assistance. Mrówka reviews that three forms of such assistance were foreseen: 1) nonrepayable subsidies; 2) loans extended by the European Investment Bank; and 3) assistance designed to foster economic stability and restructuring. These decisions of the EC were augmented by the Phare program, initiated to buttress Poland's economic and social transformations.

Taking up an evaluation of the effectiveness of these assistance programs, Mrówka describes several of the obstacles encumbering the swift receipt and absorption of available funding. Here she discusses the complexities of the relevant paperwork, as well as the barriers that emerge as per internal legal ambiguities on the part of recipient countries, Poland included. Mrówka notes that access to the funding in question has indeed been becoming harder, as the European Union has been placing ever more stringent demands on recipients.

Nonetheless, Poland has developed an effective form of donor/recipient cooperation, Mrówka writes. Moreover, she adds, the many assistance programs have become a recognized part of Poland's economic life at both the macro and micro level. Mrówka also stresses that they have contributed to the development of civil society. She writes that Poles have learned to think more and more in terms of local and social partners, rather than in reference to the state.

EU assistance in the form of preaccession funding - i.e., Phare, ISPA, and Sapard - is today the greatest source of infrastructure investment funding designed to prepare Polish institutions for their work within the structures of a united Europe. These programs also work to improve the effective utilization of structural funds, Mrówka writes. She then focuses on the role of Phare, the EU program that has provided the largest amount of nonrepayable funding (396 million euro for the period from 2001 to 2003), and gives a careful account of Phare's changing character over the past decade. Mrówka then focuses on ISPA, highlighting by way of example that program's assistance to the city of Wroc_aw for its water and wastes system. She reports that 190 million z_oties of the money that is going into the city's projects is nonrepayable assistance from the EU's ISPA program. Mrówka also describes some of the workings of the agricultural assistance fund Sapard, which already has handed over to Poland some 40 million euros. These programs, she summarizes, have generated enormous expectations and have provided local authorities with an equally enormous opportunity. She cautions, however, that local authorities must be thoroughly prepared, both financially and in terms of their staffs, to take advantage of the available funding.

Turning to non-investment EU assistance, Mrówka explains that what local communities (read: voters) most value and remember is the success their political authorities achieve in material terms, i.e., in constructing roads, sewage treatment facilities, and buildings. Voters are less willing to make lasting note of efforts to develop local government, the qualifications of personnel, and energizing grass-roots initiatives. But this is a problem all the more urgent, Mrówka writes, in that roughly 9 of 10 civic associations do not have fixed sources of income. Moreover, there has been a trend among international organizations that support society-based groups, clubs, and initiatives to withdraw from activity and assistance in Poland. More fundamentally significant still is the fact that Poland's "third sector" is underdeveloped as it is, such that the challenge to build a vibrant civil society in Poland is an exigency that must be addressed. If only for the reason, Mrówka concludes, that NGOs make up one of the most important conduits of capital flows to local communities in all their urgent developmental projects.

Europe's Constitutional Convention

Danuta Hübner

On the future of the Union and Europeans

Professor Danuta Hübner, one of Poland's three representatives at the EU's Constitutional Convention, begins her paper by recalling that it was at the December 2001 EU summit in Laeken that the decision was made to convene a Convention on Europe's future. The Laeken Declaration called into being a directorship for the Convention and determined the number of representatives to be drawn from EU member-states, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Significantly, the Declaration also contained the decision to include representatives of candidate-countries as coequals at the Convention's deliberations.

Professor Hübner explains that the Convention has been summoned to seek answers to numerous questions, among them: what is the EU's mission in today's globalized world?; how to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of EU decision-making and give it a more democratic character?; where to expand the EU's authority, and where to leave power in the hands of member-

states?; how to secure greater effectiveness and continuity in the EU's presence abroad?; Should the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament be joined to form a new, bicameral legislative body?; how to bring the EU closer to its citizens?

This last matter, Hübner stresses, is the most urgent challenge before the Convention. For what is at issue, she states, is that the EU's mission and the means of achieving it match the expectations and aspirations of EU citizens. Hübner reports that she argued this point at the Convention's April 15 plenary session, stating that what is more important than concentrating on the catalogue of competencies to be ascribed to various EU institutions is the need to focus on criteria regarding voter preferences, shared advantages at the EU level, and the rationality and effectiveness that will act to legitimize the EU.

The preferences of the EU's citizens, she emphasizes, are of highest priority, if only to redress the problem of public antipathy toward the way the EU operates. The EU must, she writes, pay careful heed to the local concerns of its citizens, for their greatest concerns are found there, within their immediate communities and regions. However, Europe's wider concerns, she continues, argue in favor of closer EU cooperation in the aim of gaining leverage vis-à-vis the global forces affecting all in Europe. Having described these issues in some detail, Professor Hübner reiterates that insofar as the Convention's purpose is to win the trust of Europeans, it must first and foremost pursue a course designed to strengthen the legitimacy of the European Union. One of several concrete measures she proposes in this vein is that of reducing the number and complexity of EU commissions in the aim of increasing transparency. She notes that the general European public sees them as "smoked-filled rooms" where decisions that impact all in the EU are made illicitly.

Turning to the issues surrounding the EU's expansion, Hübner writes that the EU must concentrate on internal security. She notes that this directly concerns Poland, as nearly 1,000 kilometers of Poland's will become the EU's borders together with Poland's admission to the EU. Management of those borders, she stresses will require close EU cooperation. She then goes on to address EU foreign policy, expressing her conviction that a strengthened EU foreign policy, as initiated by the Convention, will meet with the support of public opinion in Europe.

At the end of her article, Professor Hübner addresses the expectations Poles have vis-à-vis the EU. She notes that that the EU is seen not only as a guarantor of basic rights, but also as a guardian of justice and good governance. Hübner adds that Poles have found themselves within several empires, but they believe

that this time, as members of the European Union, their voice will be equal to those of their partners in decision-making. Hübner stresses, however, that Poles, along with the peoples of the other EU candidate countries, do seek to simplify and improve the way the EU arrives at decisions. But she says this does not mean that responsibility for achieving EU economic goals does not ultimately rest with national governments. For governments can either chose to pursue proper reforms, or they can also chose to content themselves with sluggish growth and high unemployment. Professor Hübner closes by saying, "I know which course I prefer. And I believe I know which one my fellow Poles desire".

Leszek Jesień

The European Challenges Facing Poland

Political scientist specializing in issues of European integration Leszek Jesień writes that Poland's return to Europe's mainstream presents the need to rethink the core issues of modern Europe's self-organization. In a series of questions posed at the outset of his paper Jesień asks: is a European tax necessary?; can and should a European army be created?; what is the role of Europe's national states?; and, should Europe become a federation? These are the key questions placed before the Convention, Jesień explains.

The Constitutional Convention was brought into being to address four basic issues, Jesień writes. The first is that of clarifying the division of power between the EU and member-states; the second entails devising an instrumentarium for use in attaining declared objectives; the third involves the "democratization" of the EU in an effort to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of EU citizens; and the fourth pertains to the feasibility of a constitution for Europe. Jesień goes on to analyze these four problems in detail and then stresses that were the Convention's work not to be completed before the admission of new EU members, it would have to begin all over again and in the "crisis situation" likely to ensue after the admissions of 2004.

Europe's basic problem, Jesień explains, is threefold. The first concerns the "disfunctionality" of EU institutions; the second is that of the EU's "democracy deficit"; and the third pertains to the imminent admission of up to 12 new members to the EU. Here Jesień expounds on the role and need of solidarity in Europe. How, he asks, are Europeans to strengthen the cohesion of their European identity once the EU embraces upwards of 27 countries?

Jesień next looks back over the past dozen years through the prism of the EU's work in preparing itself for expansion, calling attention to the fact that in 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU, as some years earlier had East Germany together with German reunification. But today, Jesień stresses, the European structures formed 50 years ago are no longer suitable to the task of further European integration. He therefore states that the whole structure should be overhauled.

One notable vision for such an overhaul was aired by Germany's Foreign Minister Fischer. This is the federal vision, Jesień reminds us. In his analysis of the federal vision of Europe's future Jesień addresses certain problems that would arise were the European Union not to be selfsame with any such federation - that is, were a federation to be created from only some EU member-countries. For instance, Jesień explains how EU and federal institutions would likely find themselves rivals. Nonetheless, he cautions, it is not enough to respond to Fischer's proposals by saying, "we want a federation of states à la Delors", or "we want a Europe of fatherlands à la de Gaulle". The federal proposals require thoroughgoing analyses and reflection if they are to be responded to competently

Jesień next focuses on the question of a European constitution, stressing the Convention's work in this area as the highest to date forum created to address Europe's most basic and pressing challenges. Jesień notes that an important dilemma for the Convention is that of how far to proceed, going on to closely examine such matters as the imposition of a European tax, suggesting that it would contribute to a stronger sense of European identity. However, Jesień carefully stresses that the very term "constitution" is in disfavor, noting that even Giscard d'Estaing is wont to speak of a "constitutional act", rather than a constitution. Touching the issue of a European army, Jesień opines that much of the "make or break" of a European defense identity will be had only once European forces have been committed to action. Will that first conflict, he asks symbolically, be a "Somalia" or an "Afghanistan"?

At the close of his reflections Jesień writes that ultimately the meaning of the Convention's work is to be derived from whether or not it will be successful in creating a "constitutional spirit" among Europe's citizens. He adds that following 2004 such a spirit could be expected to enable a great leap forward in European integration. But first the long-range plans for such areas as defense, taxation, a presidency, and institutional configurations must be deeply studied and evaluated.

The Convention – EU Reforms – Polish Interests

Talkshop held by the “Polska w Europie” Foundation, July 25, 2002

Zygmunt Skórzyński introduced panelists Jan Kułakowski – Poland’s former chief negotiator on EU membership – and Jan Barcz – expert on international law, former ambassador to Austria – as persons of unsurpassed qualifications for speaking about the tasks and challenges before contemporary Europe.

Moderator Jacek Czaputowicz proposed that the panelists foremost address the issue of the EU’s degree of federalization, i.e., the range of powers to rest with sovereign states on the one hand, and with international bodies on the other. He asked them to present as specific a model as possible of division of power between EU institutions and member states.

Kułakowski was first to take the floor. He began by remarking that the EU’s reforms are not connected solely to expansion. The need for reform had become apparent even without regard to the Maastricht Treaty. He said this was because the way the Union operated had undergone little change since the time when it numbered but six members.

Kułakowski then lamented the fact that so many continue to weigh the EU’s future as either “a Europe of fatherlands” or a Europe of European states. Siding with Jacques Delors, Kułakowski insisted that the EU defies such simplistic definitions, as well as comparison to existing models. Thus, he called for the EU to be defined as an original political construct, and identified this as the very task before the Constitutional Convention. He cautioned, however, that the Convention is not empowered to make decisions. Rather it is to prepare the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference.

Kułakowski expressed his concern lest the Convention focus too closely on institutional matters, explaining that what is more urgent is to reground the Union upon the principle of solidarity. He then described that principle as having two levels. The first, he stated, is comprised of three elements: 1) the need for rebalancing the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council; 2) improving the system of subsidiarity; and 3) reforming the system of structural funds. Kułakowski described the second level as that of ensuring that new and old EU members be treated on a level playing field. He stressed that this directly concerns Poland, as Poland is a “medium-large” country.

Addressing the constitutional question, Kułakowski stated his pleasure over the “constitutional treaty” formula. He explained that, for the time being, any outright effort at drafting a constitution would be problematic and might well

block the Convention's work. For this reason he said it is better to discuss policies. About the discussion over an *invocatio Dei* Kułakowski said that the point of any such preamble is to unite, not divide. If European culture were to be described as Christian, non-believers would feel they are viewed as second-class citizens. On the other hand, he continued, if Christianity is left out, then believers will feel downgraded. He added that the formula found in the preamble to Poland's constitution could well serve as a model for Europe. Kułakowski then turned to the debate over an "opt-out" clause, stressing that any treaty can be cancelled. He also stressed how terribly awkward it would be for any candidate-country to seek the inclusion of such a clause.

Poland's interests, Kułakowski stated, are directly bound to the EU's smooth and efficient functioning. Offering his advice to Poland's representatives at the Convention he cautioned them from becoming focused on the "federation or no federation" debate and then counseled that EU expansion be ever treated as a priority, that ways of harmoniously pairing expansion with internal reform be sought, and that the principle of solidarity be upheld.

Jan Barcz then spoke, stating that over the past two decades the EU had experienced profound shock. He said that Europe's identity crisis was worsened by the processes of globalization, and that the Balkan crisis had shown that Europe is impotent in dealing with matters right on its doorstep. Barcz added that what had once distinguished Europe has largely eroded away as the processes of liberalization have deepened on a global scale. In this sense, he said, expansion of the European Union represents an important vehicle fostering Europe's push to maintain a competitive edge. Barcz echoed Kułakowski's observation that the body to enact the reforms in questions is not the Constitutional Convention, but rather the Intergovernmental Conference, but then expressed his great pleasure at the fact that candidate-countries had been invited to participate in the Convention. He explained that this provided the European Union of the future with a wonderful opportunity here in the present to seriously ponder and evaluate its identity and purpose.

Barcz went on to express his belief that the European Union (which currently is comprised of two European Communities and several realms of intergovernmental cooperation) will, in the upcoming several years, become a uniform international entity. This, he suggested, could be done on the basis of a single constitutional treaty, a treaty for the European Union. He added that this variant would best suit the wishes of today's candidate-countries. Barcz then discussed other possible routes leading toward a legal rationalization of

the EU, discussing in detail some of the issues arising from the complex relationship between the Community realm and the intergovernmental realm of EU law. He drew his comments to a close with a discussion of the changing dependencies between the state realm and the Community realm. He stated that the difficulties arisen from this should be addressed by states through the enactment of relevant constitutional amendments. He noted that of major concern in this regard is the strengthening of national parliaments, especially those of candidate-countries, *vis-à-vis* national governments. But this, he pointed out, is a matter yet to taken up by Polish elites.

In the discussion period Zbigniew Wierzbicki asked whether or not those in the Convention are aware of the opinions held by Polish farmers. He stated that it would be unfortunate were Poland's referendum on joining the EU to be accepted by a small majority, over and against strong opposition from the village. What to do, he asked, to avoid such a development? He went on to suggest that the curbs which may eventually be placed on Poland's state sovereignty as a result of her membership in the EU would not become important issues for society, fears to the contrary notwithstanding.

Tadeusz Chabiera expressed his view that Poland's representatives at the Convention have confined themselves to expressing but rough ideas. He called this justified in that they lack the proper analytic bodies to prepare carefully conceived sets of concepts. He added that the confusion on Poland's political scene compounds the drafting of concrete proposals. Chabiera closed by suggesting that Poland's farmers would enjoy the support of the Polish state if there were still state-owned farms to protect. Their absence, he said, explains the liberalism in Polish agricultural policy.

Janusz Kuczyński said that while listening to recent Sejm deliberations he had the overwhelming impression that what was said had a purely political character. He added that there was no dialogue of the kind that would allow it to be understood that - "in contrast to what hasty critics of Marxism declare" - the concept of a scientifically and ethically organized society is present in humanistic European thought.

Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas argued that the difference between "constitution" and "constitutional treaty" is fundamental, noting that whereas a constitution for Europe would have to be ratified in referendum by several hundred million Europeans (or the parliament in Strasbourg), a constitutional treaty would be something ratified by European states. He went on to observe that it would be altogether unlikely that the nations of Europe would prove willing to

give up their national representation at the UN. Nor, he added, were France or the UK likely to renounce their power of veto at the Security Council.

Katarzyna Kołodziejczyk remarked that the EU's democracy deficit had prompted France and Germany to propose a strengthening of the European Council. She then asked whether or not this lay in Poland's interest, or - inasmuch as Poland is to have 51 MPs in the European Parliament - would it rather be in Poland's interest to enhance the role of the European Parliament?

Minister Kułakowski noted that the threats to folkways derive from the forces of globalization and not from the EU as such. He went on to concede that Poland is often perceived as America's Trojan Horse in Europe. Returning to the issue of an *invocatio Dei* Kułakowski argued that the Turks would by no means take umbrage at such a phrase as "In the name of God Almighty". He said that relevant Muslim texts always begin along those very lines, such that Turkey would more likely favor an *invocatio Dei*. In response to Kołodziejczyk's comments, Kułakowski stated that he supports the strengthening of the Parliament, not the Council.

Jan Barcz noted that due to obligations vis-à-vis the WTO, agricultural subsidies are to be lifted. This fact had to be reflected in the premises that went into the EU's Agenda 2000, he said.

Jacek Czaputowicz wondered whether or not there had been any progress at the Talkshop on defining Poland's interests in regards to the reforms being proposed for the European Union. He also remarked that, concerning the matter of federalism, there had been more expression of skepticism than support.

In the Wake of German Elections

Krystyna Grzybowska

The Left Retains Power in Germany

Krystyna Grzybowska reports that the victory of the German Left in elections held on September 22 was tiny and unconvincing. SPD, the party of Chancellor Schröder, won the same number of votes as the CDU/CSU coalition, and but for the success of the Greens would have been ousted. Summarizing the result of Germany's elections Grzybowska states that the present situation is one of the Schröder/Fischer government facing a colossal economic crisis and

the imperative of repairing the damage inflicted on the international stage as a result of the unprecedented anti-American campaign unleashed in the last weeks of the election campaign.

Painting a bleak picture, Grzybowska notes that unemployment in Germany (already Europe's highest) will likely rise from the current level of 4 million to 4.4 million this winter. Pessimists predict 4.7 million unemployed. She points out that the "new old coalition" has already moved for new taxes, something the Christian Democrats have said reneges on the government's campaign promises. Grzybowska adds that for this and other reasons, over 60% in Germany see no chance for improvement on the labor market or in the economy at large.

Returning to the election campaign, Grzybowska writes that Stoiber had an uphill battle in overcoming anti-Bavarian prejudices throughout the rest of Germany, but especially in the eastern lands. She reports that Stoiber's greatest support was found among young people desiring to pursue careers, and of course in the south of Germany. She next calls it undeniable that Gerhard Schröder won many votes in the former East Germany thanks to his swiftness in promising assistance to those who had suffered because of the flooding. Further support was garnered through anti-American rhetoric, she adds, quoting *Der Spiegel* as having dubbed Schröder "the Chancellor of floods and the Prince of Peace". She then discusses the surge of anti-Americanism in some detail, drawing attention not only to Justice Minister Herta Daubler-Gmelin's obnoxious excesses or the invidious comparisons of US-German relations to the USSR's occupation of East Germany, but also to the debt of gratitude Germans should harbor toward the US for matters ranging from the Marshall Plan to German reunification. The result of Germany's spasms of anti-Americanism, Grzybowska writes, is that even if US-German relations somehow return to a stable footing, Germany under Schröder will continue to be seen as an unreliable partner. She adds that this is also true of relations with Germany within the European Union, writing that the Paris-Berlin tandem has buckled under recent pressures.

Concluding her article Grzybowska states that Germany is no longer a model for economic management - not even for the post-communist countries. Today the European Commission must continually call Germany to order. This, she writes, gives cause for concern, for despite Germany's many weaknesses, its economy remains Europe's largest. If it collapses, it will drag down with it not only Europe's economy, but the very idea of integration.

Krzysztof Miszczak

Germany's Place in Twenty-first Century Europe

Krzysztof Miszczak - former deputy ambassador to Germany, currently director of the Department on European Security at Poland's Ministry for Foreign Affairs - writes that postwar Germany had pursued a policy in Europe of internationalism and multilateralism. That policy was first seen to change in the early 1990s, most notably when on December 23, 1991 - without consulting its partners - Germany recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Miszczak writes that another important stage in Germany's development of a new role in Europe occurred on October 17, 1998 when the CDU-CSU/FDP coalition lost to the Left after 16 years in power. That hand-over of power also entailed a generational change within Germany's rulers. However, even before they gained power, Miszczak writes, both the SPD and the Greens had supported the government in its decision to take part in military operations against Yugoslavia. Germany had ceased to be a junior partner in NATO and had abandoned its *Scheckbuchdiplomatie*. Thereafter Germany continued to be a staunch supporter of NATO expansion eastward, and in 2002 sent thousands of soldiers to Afghanistan.

In terms of today's politico-economic situation in Europe, Germany still occupies the central place, Miszczak writes. This the case, without a pro-active Germany policy on behalf of European unity and the securing of a lead-role for our continent in the world, these achievement will prove simply undoable. Thus, Europeans will have to reconcile themselves to the fact that Germany will pursue a "more German" policy and will seek to increase its influence. The dilemma for German leaders, Miszczak writes, is how not to squander the capital of trust it enjoys in Europe and abroad at the same time as it openly pursues its national interests.

Poland, Germany, Europe: The Expulsion Problem

Talkshop held by the "Polska w Europie" Foundation, July 4, 2002

Moderator Zygmunt Skórzyński explained that the Talkshop at hand had been summoned somewhat on an ad hoc basis in response to the need to discuss the worrisome comments recently made by Edmund Stoiber (then still the seeming shoo-in candidate for German Chancellor - ed.). Skórzyński then

thanked the illustrious panelists – Władysław Bartoszewski and Artur Hajnicz – for having at once agreed to take part in the Talkshop.

Artur Hajnicz took the floor with a brief review of his research into the “expulsion complex” and then noted that many of those who have spoken out on the topic of what Stoiber is to have said have neither taken the trouble of reading his actual words, nor of understanding their context. Nor, Hajnicz added, have they proven able to bear in mind the fact that Stoiber has in no sense questioned the outcome of World War Two, the Potsdam Conference’s article 13, nor Germany’s responsibility for the War. On the contrary, Hajnicz went on, Stoiber has often spoken of Germany’s guilt and that the Poles were among the nations to most have suffered as a result of it.

Hajnicz then focuses on Stoiber’s “faux pas” in having referred to non-existent “Bierut decrees” alongside the real decrees of Czechoslovakia’s Beneš. Here Hajnicz quickly reiterated the facts, to wit, that there simply were no such “Bierut decrees” and that the German inhabitants of the lands ceded to Poland by the victorious powers were to be “repatriated” to Germany on the basis of the determinations of the US, UK, USSR at the Potsdam Conference. Polish law, Polish decrees had nothing to do with it, he reminded.

But with a view to the fact that Stoiber’s staff, most notably Wolfgang Schäuble, was quick to correct the faux pas, Hajnicz insisted that much of the tempest raised in Warsaw was ill-advised and inappropriate. Indeed, Hajnicz stated that the vociferous indignation aired in Poland really could serve no one better than MP Giertych (one of Poland’s outspoken Euroskeptics) and Germany’s Frau Steinbach, the leader of an association of Germans who had to give up their homes in Poland’s newly-acquired territories and who demand that Poland redress their grievances. It was at one of their gatherings that Stoiber had made his ill-conceived remarks.

Władysław Bartoszewski began by reviewing the legal situation at the close of the War and during its immediate aftermath, reiterating what Hajnicz had said, i.e., that there were no “Bierut decrees” and no legal responsibility on the part of Poland for the decisions made at Potsdam regarding “population transfers”.

Turning to Steinbach and her organization, Bartoszewski said that he and Steinbach had never met. He went on to mention that she had made earnest efforts to meet him when he was a senator and the chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee. But he chose to decline. However, he did see to it that certain of his views made their way to Steinbach, namely that he viewed her claims and her chairmanship as preposterous. Here Bartoszewski explained

that Steinbach's family is not from lands today within Poland. Rather, she was born to a German soldier stationed in Poland with the Nazi occupation forces.

Bartoszewski next said that he has known Edmund Stoiber personally for some eighteen years and that he had never sensed anything approaching animosity on his part toward Polish interests. He then said the same of Schäuble. He stated that Stoiber was wont to praise Poland in his public speeches, and that sometimes he even seemed to be trying to drive a wedge between Poland and the Czechs. Bartoszewski then added as an aside that he saw no good reason for Poland to work harder on behalf of the Czechs than they do on behalf of Poland. He recalled that Vysegrad cooperation several times had been suspended due to Czech policies. Bartoszewski then briefly took up the Beneš decrees. He explained that in 1945 Czechoslovakia was a democratic country governed by a popularly elected government, that it enjoyed legitimacy, and that Beneš was a leader having the support not only of the Left. The decrees he issued were both legal and approved of by the nation.

Professor Bartoszewski then talked about his conversations with German politician Markus Meckel, a Protestant pastor by profession, who had spoken to him of the ideas to open a center in Berlin for those affected by the expulsions, as well as a center to conduct research into the expulsions that affected Germans, Poles, and other Europeans. Meckel also (somewhat hastily Bartoszewski said) proposed Wrocław as the site for this center. Bartoszewski noted that Stoiber had said that as Chancellor he would help advance those plans. Bartoszewski stated that he has mixed feelings about any such centers, but that overall he is in favor. He explained that he sees no real reason to build the proposed centers, whether in Germany or Poland, but if they are to come into being, "let's be realists", he said, and help make them European, give them a purview that takes in the beginning of the War and its earliest atrocities, too.

Andrzej Hałaciński spoke up during the discussion period "as the father of a 10 year-old daughter and the son of 70 year-old parents". He said that with regard to today's children we are of course to look to the future - as we are with regard to senior citizens as well, for then can we see those echoing Stoiber's words in starkest relief, as when they fume "insolent fascists".

Jeremi Sadowski asked if Germany's longstanding feud with the Czechs is about to spill over to Poland. What to do in that event, he asked. And would that signal a deterioration in Germany's interest in Central Europe?

Andrzej Ziemilski introduced himself as someone who personally had expelled Germans from Gliwice in early 1945, something he has published two

books about. He stated that there is no reason for Poles to fool themselves: getting rid of the phrase “Bierut decrees” will not get rid of the problem. He added that when Bierut drove to Gliwice, an NKVD orchestra played the Polish anthem and the handful of Poles who had managed to survive the fascists did not know whether to laugh or cry. History, he said, is not quite the way it looks in diplomatic communiqués.

Róża Thun stated that local German politicians have not even heard of Steinbach, arguing that she is best known in Poland, where she is unwittingly promoted.

Klaus Zimmer seconded Thun’s remarks and then, trying to give some perspective on the surge of interest in the expulsions, said that each generation must be permitted to discover the past anew.

In response to the some of the opinions voiced suggesting that Germans generally do not think favorably about Poles, Bartoszewski said that he does not agree, that what really is at work in the way Germans think of and view Poles is lack of knowledge and simple lack of interest. Professor Bartoszewski then went on to forcefully express his repulsion at the notion ostensibly gaining ground in Germany about WWII, according to which the Jews were victims, and the Germans, too. He called this an instrumentalization he vehemently opposes.

Documents

Jeremi Sadowski

Science, Education, and Culture: A fourth pillar for the European Union?

Jeremi Sadowski of the Polish Council of the European Movement writes that dire and challenging times have come to Europe. Sadowski argues that the surprising success of extreme rightist parties in a range of European countries, along with such matters as the enormous hindrances placed before EU candidate-countries in pursuing EU membership, are symptoms reflecting a flagging of the European spirit - not indications of a political crisis. Sadowski stresses that this enfeebled spirit sooner or later will impact the functioning of institutions and ultimately paralyze them from within. The fact that one of every five Europeans is ready to cast their vote for xenophobic parties can no longer be

made light of, he states, adding that Europeans must therefore act lest the European ethos undergo further debility.

In his article Sadowski reviews some of the EU's past noting various failed opportunities, among them that eastward expansion was not taken up with a sense of historic mission. Instead, Sadowski writes, it has been fraught with a reservation and doubt that have seemed to stall the whole process indefinitely. This, he observes, has directly led to the rise of extremisms on both sides.

But just how to break free of the impasse and transform the present doubts and hesitation into the enthusiasm and passion without which a common Europe cannot be achieved? Sadowski proposes that one bold step in that direction would be to embrace science, education, and culture within a common European policy. Hitherto, and in accord with the wishes of EU member-states themselves, these areas have remained outside the process of European integration, he writes. But has not the time come to review that position? Investing in human capital, which in fact means investing in science, education, and culture, has long been a guiding principle in societies committed to modernization, he notes. Thus, he stresses that it would be peculiar were Europe not to draw the appropriate conclusions from this. Making heavy industry and agricultural policy a Community matter was a fine idea for integration in the 1950s and 60s - some half century ago. Today, he points out, it is becoming an anachronism to treat them as the priority.

Extending the process of European integration to include science, education and culture, Sadowski continues, would allow countries pursuing membership in the EU to take part in joint research and educational programs, and thus to strengthen their ties with Europe's leaders. The "Fifteen", in turn, would be able to compete with the US, Japan, and other countries of Asia. In the first instance such an extension as Sadowski proposes would dispel a portion of the anxieties over being a member of Europe's "B" league - and in the second, a portion of the fear of globalism's darker sides. For not only are the candidate-countries suffering from marked underinvestment when it comes to science, education, and culture, Sadowski observes. Indeed, in some cases even to an alarming degree, so are countries belonging to the "Fifteen", especially when they are compared to Japan or the United States.

Close co-operation in these areas would strengthen the more traditional European bonds and thereby accelerate the processes of creating a European identity, something which, following the removal of the Iron Curtain, must often be built anew. A joint defense policy and joint foreign policy for the EU

should be further developed, Sadowski insists, but it would be unrealistic to expect (with Eurocorps numbering 60,000 soldiers) that that road will lead to the emergence of a new European identity. However, an emergence and grounding of that identity may be achieved through joint, yearslong educational programs and research, as well as through an intensified exchange of cultural goods. Such would also entail the long awaited corrective to the EU's overly economic approach to the issues of integration, something which a large number of Europeans is highly critical of. Tomorrow's Europe would in this way have rather more "spirit" than it does today.

It is obvious that a program of this type should be elaborated by a large team of experts, Sadowski notes. Publicists and activists of the European Movement can lend inspiration to this process through brainstorming general scenarios. But "the devil's in the details", he writes. The creation of a project of this type of co-operation therefore would have to take into consideration not only the budgetary possibilities of the European Union, but also the oft'times conflicting interests of member-states and the principle of subsidiarity. Brussels cannot supplant member-states in pursuing educational or research policy. Brussels can, however, introduce such programs as would supplement, strengthen and co-ordinate that policy. Sadowski writes that specialists speak of synergy in cases like this. If such synergy could be achieved on a significant scale, he continues, then a new thrust of activity would emerge, one that would break through the current impasse.

In keeping with the declarations of the Lisbon Agenda, by 2010 the European Union is to become the most dynamically developing region of the world, in large measure through having harnessed its scientific potential. In this context there is talk of creating a European Scientific Zone and increasing expenditures on research. It would seem that without an expansion of that project to include education and culture, and without a solid base of institutional support, this will prove but another half measure, one lacking the requisite inspirational power, Sadowski states. And yet such inspiration indeed is necessary if the European project is to gain a new dynamism and inspire successive generations of Europeans, ones shaped in entirely different conditions than those known after the War.

Sadowski appeals to all the participants of the European Movement in Poland to take part in discussion on this project. He also appeals for the elaboration of a detailed report on EU co-operation in the three areas of science, education and culture, a report to present the current state of that co-operation and

the benefits that will result from its intensification and development. In closing he asks, “can an institution be found in Poland to take up this task?”.

APPEAL OF THE POLISH COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

LET’S CREATE A FOURTH EU PILLAR!

1. The debate over Poland’s place in Europe has persisted for years. Among those speaking out there have been activists of European organisations, scientists and academics, publicists and – somewhat less often – members of successive governments. And although it behoves us to express our satisfaction over the fact that the debate has continued, we must at the same time stress that its outcomes are highly dissatisfying. Poland’s entrance into the European Union is certainly a great challenge, nonetheless we feel compelled to ask ourselves, what next? Facing, as we do, extreme rightist parties on the offensive across the West, our question gains an even greater urgency. We are presently experiencing a pronounced crisis in European identity.

We must, therefore, jointly search for ways out of this situation.

2. In light of this the Polish Council of the European Movement proposes that the embrace of science, education and culture within a common European policy be discussed. Hitherto, and in accord with the wishes of EU member-states themselves, these areas have remained outside the process of European integration. But has the time not come to revise that position? Investing in human capital, which in fact means investing in science, education and culture, has long been a guiding principle in societies committed to modernisation. Thus it would be peculiar were Europe not to draw the appropriate conclusions from this. Making heavy industry and agricultural policy a Community matter was a fine idea for integration in the 1950s and 60s – some half century ago. Today it is becoming an anachronism to treat them as the priority.

3. Extending the process of European integration to include science, education and culture would allow countries pursuing membership in the EU to take part in joint research and educational programmes, and thus to strengthen their ties with Europe’s leaders. The “Fifteen”, in turn, would be able to compete with the US, Japan and other countries of Asia. In the first instance such an extension as we propose would dispel a portion of the anxieties over being a member of Europe’s “B” league – and in the second, a portion of the fear of global-

ism's darker sides. For not only are the candidate-countries suffering from marked underinvestment when it comes to science, education, and culture. Indeed, in some cases even to an alarming degree, so are countries belonging to the "Fifteen", especially when they are compared to Japan or the United States.

4. Close co-operation in these areas would strengthen the more traditional European bonds and thereby accelerate the processes of creating a European identity, something which, following the removal of the Iron Curtain, must often be built anew. A joint defence policy and joint foreign policy for the EU should be further developed, but it would be unrealistic to expect (with Eurocorps numbering 60,000 soldiers) that that road will lead to the emergence of a new European identity. However, an emergence and grounding of that identity may be achieved through joint, yearslong educational programmes and research, as well as through an intensified exchange of cultural goods. Such would also entail the long awaited corrective to the EU's overly economic approach to the issues of integration, something which a large number of Europeans is highly critical of.

5. It is obvious that a programme of this type should be elaborated by a large team of experts. Publicists and activists of the European Movement can lend inspiration to this process through brainstorming general scenarios. But as we know, "the devil's in the details". The creation of a project of this type of co-operation therefore would have to take into consideration not only the budgetary possibilities of the European Union, but also the oft'times conflicting interests of member-states and - last but not least - the principle of subsidiarity. Brussels cannot supplant member-states in pursuing educational or research policy. Brussels can, however, introduce such programmes as would supplement, strengthen and co-ordinate that policy. Specialists speak of synergy in cases like this. If such synergy could be achieved on a significant scale, then a new thrust of activity would emerge, one that would break through the current impasse.

6. In keeping with the declarations of the Lisbon Agenda, by 2010 the European Union is to become the most dynamically developing region of the world, in large measure through having harnessed its scientific potential. In this context there is talk of creating a European Scientific Zone and increasing expenditures on research. It would seem that without an expansion of that project to include education and culture, and without a solid base of institutional support, this will prove but another half measure, one lacking the requisite inspirational power.

And yet such inspiration indeed is necessary if the European project is to gain a new dynamism and imbue successive generations of Europeans, ones shaped in entirely different conditions than those known after the War, with its spirit.

7. This is why we submit that a detailed report be prepared as soon as possible on EU co-operation in the three areas of science, education and culture, a report to present the current state of that co-operation and the benefits that will result from its intensification and development. By no means would this be intended to deprive member-states of their current prerogatives; rather, it would be intended to prompt consideration as to the range and extent that said areas might also become the focus of a common European policy, one anticipated to develop and provide support.

8. At the same time we appeal to all the participants of the European Movement in Poland to take part in discussion on this project. We also call on them for suggestions on how to develop closer co-operation between the leading universities of our countries. Let the structure created in support of these European centres be open to other institutions of learning! And let it give impetus to similar such initiatives, ones which, if only on a laboratory scale, will testify to the future possibilities of exchange.

9. We also direct this appeal to the representatives of the European Movement in other countries, counting on their help and support. Let us together put flesh on this project and submit it to public opinion. For in this way we can create the outline of a fourth pillar for the European Union, a pillar that should be destined to play a role at least as crucial as those of the three hitherto existing pillars.

Warsaw, August 2002

The Polish Council of the European Movement

**On behalf of the Polish
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